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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

of Congress, to apply the law of the land to facts developed of record in
matters committed by Congress to our jurisdiction."
T. W. HAYDEN
Courts: Attorney and Client
State v. Cannon.1
This was an action to disbar from the practice of law, the defendant,
Raymond J. Cannon. The original action against Cannon was begun
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court by the State Bar Commissioners, May
10, 1928, pursuant to the provisions of section 25628 of the Statutes of
1927.
The Honorable E. C. Fiedler was referred to the case, and it was
he who took the testimony and reported the fact. He recommended that
Cannon be suspended from practice for two years, and that he be required to pay the expenses and costs of the action. The defendant was
disclosed by the record as a man whose purpose it was to let nothing
stand in the way of making his profession yield him the largest possible
financial return, without regard to the established canons of professional
conduct. To accomplish that end, the referee foudd that he began the
Huelse suit without authority from the injured man; that he improperly
displaced attorneys previously retained; that he purposely and knowingly
misled and deceived courts; that he collected excessive, exorbitant, and
unconscionable fees from his clients; and that he commercialized his
profession by the organized solicitation of business.
Because of the severe penalty imposed upon Cannon for his "ambulance chasing" proclivities, the case should command the attention
of the entire Wisconsin bar, because its interests are at stake. In fact,
Justice Crownhart in his dissenting opinion said: "If attorneys may be
subjected to such inquisitions and ruthless charges in the future, we may
expect a weak and spineless bar-one that will be afraid to fight the
battles of the poor and humble as they ought to be fought to secure
justice."
The question of the powers of the courts to disbar attorneys was
an important one. This case is not the first one in which the unethical
conduct of attorneys has been criticized. The power to protect courts
and the public from the official ministration of persons unfit for practice
in them was fully established in the former decision of the court in this
case, State v. Cannon,2 where it was held that, when the people by means
of the Constitution established courts, they became endowed with all
judicial powers essential to carry out the judicial functions delegated
to them.
'226 N.W. 385; Wis.
'196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603.

NOTES AND COMMENT

The efficient administration of justice by the courts demands that they
should be aided by members of the bar who are "quasi officers of the
state whose justice is administered by the court."'3 In this respect the bar
is as important as the bench. "It is very important to the people and the
court that the standard of admission to the place and retention thereof
should be as high as practicable in law, and maintained as high as practicable in fact. Much power in that regard is vested in the court by the
Constitution, incidental to its possession of judicial power and its duty to
enforce, through careful administration, legislative tests of eligibility." 4
Should these legislative tests of eligibility be absent, the courts are
empowered to protect themselves and clients from attorneys who have
disabled themselves as ministers of justice.
"It is well settled that a court authorized to admit an attorney has
inherent jurisdiction to suspend or disbar him for sufficient cause, and
that such jurisdiction does not necessarily depend upon any express
constitutional provision of statutory enactment."5
In Wisconsin the courts frequently exercised this inherent power before the enactment of Chapter 84, Laws of 1903, which was the first
legislative act upon the subject of disbarment in Wisconsin. But the
deciding statute in the Cannon case was section 256.26, Stats. 1927.
It was shown that Cannon had bargained with a district attorney in
an abortion case, where Cannon promised that his client would plead
guilty, if the district attorney would permit his client to retain his license
to practice medicine. Such conduct, however, has been aptly characterized by Chief Justice Ryan: "Any agreement of the character here in
question .... between a public prosecutor and an attorney of the defendant in an indictment is ....a bargain for judicial action and judgment, hardly, if at all, distinguishable in principle from a direct sale
6
of justice.
Cannon had perfected a very efficient organization for the solicitation
of negligence and criminal cases. This practice has been criticized by
the Supreme Court as "the most abominable and offensive professional
misconduct."'7 Its is a practice to which "no reputable attorney in this
state will resort."
The ,Cannon case is distinguishable from the Kiefer case by the fact
that the defendant in that case had demonstrated by his conduct that he
"was fully convinced of the unprofessional conduct involved in those
'In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509,510, 20 Am. Rep. 55.

Vernon County Bar Assoc. v. McKibbin, 153 Wis. 350, 352, 141 N.W. 283, 284.

6 C.J. 580.
'Wright v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 354, 356, 357.
'222 N.W. 795, 796.
S C.M. St. P. R. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N.W. 218, 223.
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practices." The court therefore concluded that a suspension of the
license to practice was "not necessary to give time for reformation of
the defendant." 9
Cannon, on the other hand, although criticized in Hepp v. Petie,10 for
similar misconduct, had shown up to the time of trial no reformation of
practice methods, and so was suspended from the practice of law in the
state of Wisconsin for two years. The referee found that the defendant
charged unconscionable and excessive fees for services performed. He
thus showed that he had not recognized the fact that "the practice of law
is not a trade, but a ministry."''
It is as true today as it was fifty years ago, when Chief Justice Ryan
said in his address before the graduates of the University Law School,
that "the pursuit of the legal profession for the mere wages of life is
a mistake alike of the means and the end. It is a total failure of appreciation of the character of the profession."
CARL F. ZEIDLER

Guaranty: Liability: Compromise and Settlement
When a party guarantees that an agent will perform his contract with
his principal by guaranteeing to pay anything due under the terms of
the contract, said party thereby makes himself primarily liable to the
principal. Any settlement made by the agent with his principal will not
release the guarantor from his liability because of a lack of consideration, the agent being a stranger to the contract made between the principal and the guarantor. In case the agent defaults or fails to perform
his contract, and there is still money due and owing the principal, the
principal can accept whatever the agent is able to advance. Such acceptance does not constitute a wavier of the principal's right to collect
the deficiency from the guarantor. He has in fact contracted to answer
to the principal in just such a situation as this.
The simple rule of law that a guaranty contract involves primary
liability is quite fundamental and necessary know-ledge for the practicing
attorney to have tucked away in his mind. It concerns a situation that
is common and liable to confront him any day. The recent case of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Swift and Co. v. Geraghty, 226 N.W. 381,
furnishes a foundation for this brief review on the nature of a guaranty
contract of this kind. The main fact to bear in mind is that the guaranty
contract is separate and apart from the contract entered into between
principal and agent. It concerns only principal and guarantor, the
'State v. Kiefer (Wis.) 222 N.W. 795, 797.
' 185 Wis. 350, 200 N.W. 857.
' Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 381, 385, 161 N.W. 364, 366.

